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I. INTRODUCTION 
The West’s post-Holocaust pledge that genocide would never again be 
tolerated proved to be hollow, and for all the fine sentiments inspired by 
the memory of Auschwitz, the problem remains that denouncing evil is a 
far cry from doing good.1 
There are acts so heinous as to constitute “the worst crime known to 
humankind.”2 A crime that makes comrades out of the “unemployed, the 
delinquents, and the gangs of thugs in the militia,”3 and exhorts them to 
“exterminate the cockroaches”4 The plan was simple: “kill every Tutsi without 
exception.”5 
 
1. PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR 
FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA 170 (1998). In Article II of Genocide Convention, the crime of genocide is 
defined as: “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group, such as: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and] 
forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260, U.N. Doc. A/RES/260 (Dec. 9, 1948) (hereinafter “Genocide 
Convention”). 
2. Michael P. Scharf & Brianne M. Draffin, Foreword: To Prevent and to Punish: An International 
Conference in Commemoration of the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Genocide Convention, 40 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 1 (2007-2008) [hereinafter To Prevent and to Punish]. 
3. Hate Radio, RWANDAN STORIES, http://www.rwandanstories.org/genocide/hate_radio.html (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2014). 
4. See Russell Smith, The Impact of Hate Media in Rwanda, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/africa/3257748.stm (last updated Dec. 3, 2003) (detailing the incitement of genocide towards the Tutsis 
using coded language). 
5. A Simple Plan, RWANDAN STORIES, http://www.rwandanstories.org/genocide/simple_plan.html (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2014). 
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And, without exception, the machete wielding perpetrators hacked men, 
women, and children to death.6 “Women were splayed on public roads” with 
mutilated genitalia exposed.7 Tutsis attempting to flee were met with sudden 
death when their identity cards were checked and seized at roadblocks.8 In the 
aftermath, some 800,000 people (Tutsis and moderate Hutus) were massacred in 
what the international community has come to recognize as the 1994 Rwandan 
Genocide.9 
In response to the Rwandan Genocide, the United Nation’s Security Council 
created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in November 
1994, based in Arusha, Tanzania.10 In addition, domestic courts in Rwanda 
launched prosecutions.11 In conjunction with domestic prosecutions in Rwanda, 
community-based Gacaca courts addressed the backlog of domestic prosecutions 
and tried suspects in villages throughout the country.12 But, how have the States 
parties to the Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Genocide Convention) responded to the Rwandan Genocide in terms 
of prosecution in national courts outside of Rwanda?13 
This inquiry is timely because “the mechanisms created to bring 
accountability for the Rwandan Genocide are wrapping up their work.”14 As of 
June 2012, the Gacaca courts15 finished their work, and the ICTR is scheduled to 
complete its work by the end of 2014.16 Thus, domestic prosecutions for the 
crime of genocide are increasingly important.17 
 
6. Susan Sontag, Preface to JEAN HATZFELD, MACHETE SEASON: THE KILLERS IN RWANDA SPEAK, vii 
(Farrar et. Al. eds. 2005). 
7. Nancy Sail, Rwanda, Women Under Siege (Feb. 8, 2012, 9:40AM), http://www.womenundersiege 
project.org/ conflicts/profile/rwanda. 
8. Roadblocks, RWANDAN STORIES, http://www.rwandanstories.org/genocide/simple_plan.html (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2014). 
9. Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1288230.stm (last 
updated Dec. 18, 2008) (presenting an in-depth treatment on the causes of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide). 
10. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). See also Karen Corrie, Beyond Arusha: The Global 
Effort to Prosecute Rwanda’s Genocide, Comment to Voices, OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATION (Apr. 17, 2013, 
10:20PM), http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/beyond-arusha-global-effort-prosecute-rwandas-
genocide. 
11. Corrie, supra note 10. 
12. Id. 
13. See generally id. 
14. Id. 
15. See Linda M. Keller, The False Dichotomy of Peace Versus Justice and the International Criminal 
Court, 3 HAGUE JUST. J. 12, 41 (2008), available at  http://www.issafrica.org/anicj/uploads/Keller_ 
Dichotomy_of_Peace _versus_Justice.pdf (arguing that alternative justice mechanisms can provide adequate 
“punishment by incorporating local beliefs and customs as accountability measures for a larger number of 
offenders.”). For a more in-depth treatment of the Gacaca trials see Linda E. Carter, Justice and Reconciliation 
on Trial: Gacaca Proceedings in Rwanda, 14:1 NEW ENG. INT’L & COMP. L. 42 (2007). 
16. Corrie, supra note 10. 
17. Id. 
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This Comment posits that there is a legal obligation under the Genocide 
Convention to bring an end to impunity for the crime of genocide.18 To that end, 
this article evaluates States parties’ (United States, Canada, France, and the 
Netherlands) compliance with the ancillary obligations under the Genocide 
Convention: enactment of legislation and punishment by way of persecution or 
holding génocidaires accountable through extradition. 
Part II of this Comment introduces the principle of universal jurisdiction as 
applied during the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg 
Tribunal). Part III provides a comparative study of the aforementioned States 
parties’ paths towards ratification and enactment of domestic legislation to 
implement the Genocide Convention. Part IV provides a case study of domestic 
prosecutions in relation to the Rwandan Genocide. Part V provides an analysis of 
political considerations, legal interpretations of international instruments, and 
policies that may factor into States parties’ legal decisions to forego prosecution 
under domestic laws criminalizing genocide. Part VI argues that employing 
immigration remedies as a pretext for domestic prosecutions for the crime of 
genocide minimizes the gravity of the crime of genocide. To that end, Part VII 
evaluates the economic costs versus the societal costs of domestic prosecutions. 
Lastly, Part VIII concludes that domestic prosecutions are a deterrence 
mechanism that should be employed in the fight against impunity for the crime of 
genocide. 
II. THE CONCEPT OF GENOCIDE: FROM NUREMBERG TO PARIS 
The concept of genocide is derived from the atrocities that occurred during 
Nazi occupation of Germany.19 Genocide is a neologism20 coined by Raphael 
Lemkin in 1944 by combining genos, the Greek word for race, and cide, the 
Latin word for killing.21 Lemkin introduced the term in his book titled, Axis Rule 
in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation – Analysis of Government Proposals 
for Redress, which demonstrated profound foresight into the “darker purpose for 
Hitler’s war.” 22 
 
18. Juan E. Méndez, The United Nations and the Prevention of Genocide, in THE CRIMINAL LAW OF 
GENOCIDE: INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE AND CONTEXTUAL ASPECTS 226, 226 (Ralph Henham & Paul 
Behrens eds., 2007). 
19. William A. Schabas, Origins of the Genocide Convention: From Nuremberg to Paris, 40 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 35, 41 (2007-2008). 
20. William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes (2000), http://catdir. 
loc.gov/catdir/samples/cam032/99087924.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2014). 
21. To Prevent and to Punish, supra note 2. 
22. Michael Ignatieff, The Unsung Hero Who Coined the Term Genocide, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 21, 
2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/114424/raphael-lemkin-unsung-hero-who-coined-genocide. 
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Shortly thereafter, the term was included in the indictments during the 
Nuremberg Tribunal;23 however, the term genocide was not included in the final 
judgment. 24 In fact, Henry T. King, Jr., a former war crimes prosecutor, recalled 
that Lemkin “was very upset that the [Nuremberg Tribunal] did not go far 
enough in dealing with genocide actions . . . because it limited its judgment to 
wartime genocide and [excluded] peacetime genocide.”25 Lemkin’s displeasure 
with the Nuremberg Tribunal’s judgment resonated with Cuba, India, and 
China26, three United Nations member states.27 Thus, a few days after the 
Nuremberg Tribunal’s judgment was issued, on September 30 and October 1, 
1946, the three member states proposed a resolution to include peacetime 
genocide at the first session of the General Assembly.28 This resolution eventually 
led to the adoption of the Genocide Convention.29 Hence, Lemkin is largely 
recognized as the “Father of the Genocide Convention.”30 
A. Universal Jurisdiction under Customary International Law 
The principle of universal jurisdiction is rooted in customary international 
law.31 While Lemkin is recognized as the “Father of the Genocide Convention,”32 
the principle of universal jurisdiction, as it relates to the crime of genocide, can 
be attributed to Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson.33 Justice Jackson 
proposed the elimination of the defense of sovereign immunity and superior 
orders, which later became a part of the London Charter of August 8, 1945 upon 
which the Nuremberg trial was based.34 This recommendation led to the 
“recognition of genocide as a crime against humanity.”35 Once genocide was 
internationally recognized as a crime against humanity, Jackson advocated for 
the principle of universal jurisdiction to hold those who carried out the genocidal 
 
23. The Nuremberg International Military Tribunal was held from 1945 to 1949 and consisted of a series 
of 13 trials conducted in Nuremberg, Germany, in an effort to bring Nazi war criminals to justice. 
24. To Prevent and to Punish, supra note 2, at 1-2. 
25.  Schabas, supra note 19; Henry T. King Jr., Genocide and Nuremberg, in THE CRIMINAL LAW OF 
GENOCIDE: INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE AND CONTEXTUAL ASPECTS 29 (Ralph Henham & Paul Behrens 
eds., 2007). 
26. As an aside, “In 1945, the leaders of the Nationalist and Communist parties, Chiang Kai-shek and 
Mao Zedong, met for a series of talks on the formation of a post-war government,” but a civil war broke out in 
1946. U.S. Dep’t of State, Milestones 1945-1952: The Chinese Revolution of 1949, http://history. 
state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev (last visited Feb. 14, 2013). 
27.  Schabas, supra note 19. 
28. Id. at 35-36. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 36-37. 
31. Henry T. King Jr., supra note 25. 
32. Schabas, supra note 19, at 36-37. 
33. Henry T. King Jr., supra note 25. 
34. Id. at 32. 
35. Id. at 34-35. 
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acts responsible.36 Although, the “concept of universal jurisdiction is long 
standing in international law stemming from its application from the seventeenth 
century onwards to pirates,”37 Jackson’s opening statement, in which he 
announced that “the real complaining party at your bar is civilization,”38 made 
universal jurisdiction “the most important principle derived from Nuremberg.”39 
B. The Genocide Convention: Universal Jurisdiction? 
The concept of universal jurisdiction is essentially the “international 
recognition of [an] offense that is of universal concern.”40 While, what constitutes 
universal concern is debatable, as stated previously, universal jurisdiction has its 
origins in piracy.41 By extension, genocide, like piracy, is an offense against the 
law of nations.42 Furthermore, the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law 
recognizes that a State has “jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment 
for . . . genocide, war crimes, and . . . terrorism.”43 Indeed, the United States has 
invoked universal jurisdiction in the context of several of its criminal statutes. 
For example, in the case of terrorism, the United States can exercise universal 
jurisdiction over conduct that materially supports terrorism.44 Also, the 
Convention Against Torture provides for universal jurisdiction.45 
Likewise, in practice, the principle of universal jurisdiction has been 
exercised in criminal cases.46 In 1962, The Israeli Court sentenced Adolf 
Eichmann to death for the crime of genocide on the basis of universal jurisdiction 
upon rejection of his argument that Israel was not a state when the crimes were 
committed.47 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals extradited John 
 
36. Id. at 33. 
37. Id. 
38. King, supra note 25, at 33 (quoting Justice Jackson). 
39. Id. (quoting Richard Goldstone, the first prosecutor at the Hague proceedings). 
40. Zachary Pall, Note, The Genocide Accountability Act and U.S. Law: The Evolution and Lessons of 
Universal Jurisdiction for Genocide, 3 INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS. L. 13, 15 (2008-2009). 
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2008) (“Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the 
law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life.”). See 
also 18 U.S.C. § 1653 (2008). 
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2008) (provides that Congress may “define and punish Piracies and Felonies 
committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.”). 
43. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 404 (1987). 
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(d)(1)(C) (exercising universal jurisdiction when “after the conduct required for the 
offense occurs an offender is brought into or found in the United States, even if the conduct required for the 
offense occurs outside the United States.”). 
45. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, arts. 
5-8, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 115. 
46. See cases cited infra note 47-48. 
47. See The Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann, District Court of Jerusalem, 
Criminal Case No. 40/61, Judgment (Dec. 15, 1961), I.L.R. 1968 §§ 19-21. 
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Demjanjuk, an Ukrainian immigrant, who had become a naturalized United 
States citizen, to Israel on the basis of universal jurisdiction for war crimes.48 
But, even supposing “that . . . genocide is an international crime so heinous 
that [génocidaires] can be subject [to] trials in any court that is willing to take 
jurisdiction over them,”49 the question remains whether the Genocide Convention 
codifies the principle of universal jurisdiction.50 A textualist reading of the treaty 
would conclude that the Genocide Convention did not contemplate universal 
jurisdiction over acts of genocide.51 Article VI of the Genocide Convention 
provides: 
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in 
article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the 
territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal 
tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting 
Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.52 
Nevertheless, State parties to the Genocide Convention have roundly adhered 
to the principle of universal jurisdiction, under customary international law, when 
implementing legislation to give effect to the provisions of the Genocide 
Convention.53 
III. A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON RATIFICATION OF THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 
AND IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 
Article V of the Genocide Convention provides as follows: 
The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their 
respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the 
provisions of the present Convention, and, in particular, to provide 
 
48. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985). The United States does not have a war crimes 
statute. However, the Sixth Circuit found support in exercising universal jurisdiction in the Restatement of 
Foreign Law. But, since the decision was later vacated, there are questions as to whether the reasoning in 
applying universal jurisdiction is valid. 
49. King, supra note 25, at 33. 
50. For a more in-depth treatment of universal jurisdiction and the Genocide Convention see Zachary 
Pall, Note, The Genocide Accountability Act and U.S. Law: The Evolution and Lessons of Universal 
Jurisdiction for Genocide, 3 INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS. L. 13-17 (2008-2009). 
51.  Pall, supra note 40, at 13-17. 
52. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/260 (Dec. 9, 1948)  (hereinafter “Genocide Convention”). 
53. See infra Part III. 
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effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts 
enumerated in Article III.54 
Unsurprisingly, States have followed different paths in implementing 
legislation criminalizing genocide.55 Ultimately, however, a survey of statutes 
criminalizing genocide appear to affirm the broad acceptance of universal 
jurisdiction over the crime of genocide.56 Indeed, universal jurisdiction is not 
dependent upon the Genocide Convention, as a jus cogens57 crime it is subject to 
universal jurisdiction just like piracy.58 
A. The United States’ Path Towards Ratification and Enacting Legislation 
Implementing The Genocide Convention 
The United States’ road to ratification of the Genocide Convention is long 
and paved with apprehension.59 Although the United States was a signatory to the 
Genocide Convention in 1948, the Genocide Convention was not ratified until 
1988,60 after the passage of the implementing legislation. 
There are several reasons why the passage of the Genocide Convention 
languished for nearly forty years. The United States feared their racial policies 
might be prosecuted as genocide, suspected that trials of service personnel would 
be legitimized, and believed that the United States’ sovereignty would be 
diluted.61 Thus, the United States registered the following reservations upon 
ratification: 
(1) That with reference to article IX of the Convention, before any 
dispute to which the United States is a party may be submitted to the 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under this article, the 
specific consent of the United States is required in each case. 
 
54. Reservations on the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. 
Res. 260, U.N. Doc. A/RES/260 (Dec. 9, 1948). (hereinafter “Reservations”). 
55. There are four paths that States have followed in implementing legislation criminalizing genocide: 1) 
passing no additional statutes to specifically address genocide; (2) criminalizing genocide and granting 
jurisdiction over acts of genocide falling under the traditional bases of jurisdiction; (3) criminalizing genocide 
and allowing jurisdiction where the accused is in the territory of the state; or (4) allowing universal jurisdiction 
regardless of the location of the accused. Pall, supra note 40. 
56. See infra Part III.B-D. 
57. STEPHEN MCCAFFREY, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW  ix (2006) 
58.  Méndez, supra note 18. 
59.  Pall, Note, supra note 40, at 13. 
60. Id. 
61. United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Treaties, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails. 
aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) 
[hereinafter Status of Treaties]. 
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(2) That nothing in the Convention requires or authorizes legislation or 
other action by the United States of America prohibited by the 
Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States.62 
As a consequence, the Lugar-Helms-Hatch Sovereignty Package 
(Sovereignty Package), which weakened the Genocide Convention and 
guaranteed that the United States maintained its full sovereignty, accompanied 
the Senate ratification.63 The Sovereignty Package also required the passage of 
implementing legislation before Congress would deposit the instruments of 
ratification with the United Nations.64 The implementing legislation became 
known as the Proxmire Act.65 
1. The Proxmire Act 
As written, the Proxmire Act did not contemplate the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction.66 Prosecution was only permitted when “the offense is committed 
within the United States”67 or where “the alleged offender is a national of the 
United States . . .”68 
2. The Genocide Accountability Act 
In contrast, the Genocide Accountability Act of 2007 (GAA) expands the 
jurisdictional reach of the Proxmire Act to where: 
(3) the alleged offender is an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence in the United States (as that term is defined in section 101 of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101)); (4) the alleged 
offender is a stateless person whose habitual residence is in the United 
States; or (5) after the conduct required for the offense occurs, the 
alleged offender is brought into, or found in, the United States, even if 
that conduct occurred outside the United States.69 
Thus, as written the GAA establishes “federal criminal jurisdiction over the 
crime of genocide, wherever the crime is committed.”70 
 
62. Id. 
63. Resolution of Ratification (Lugar-Helms-Hatch Sovereignty Package), S. Exec. Rep. 2, 99th Cong., 
1st sess. (1985). 
64. Id. 
65. Pub. L. No. 100-606 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1091). 
66.  Pall, supra note 40, at 23. 
67. 18 U.S.C. § 1091(d)(1). 
68. 18 U.S.C. § 1091(d)(2). 
69. Genocide Accountability Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-151, 121 Stat. 1821. 
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2008); Pall, supra note 40, at 25. 
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B. Canada’s Path 
Canada ratified the Genocide Convention on September 3, 1952.71 Unlike the 
United States, Canada did not register any reservations.72 However, it was only as 
recent as 2000 that Canada incorporated universal jurisdiction, as an over-arching 
principle, over the crime of genocide into its domestic legal system.73 Under the 
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act of 2000, Canada enjoys a broad 
application of universal jurisdiction over any person who commits the crime of 
genocide and is present in Canada, regardless of their nationality.74 
C. France 
France ratified the Genocide Convention on October 14, 1950.75 While, 
France, like Canada, has not registered a reservation or objection to the Genocide 
Convention,76 its “position with respect to genocide is . . . rather paradoxical.”77 
For example, on March 1, 1994, France introduced Article 211-1 Code pénal to 
penalize genocide which adopts a more objective criterion to the Genocide 
Convention’s intent element, and enlarges the scope of the definition of 
genocide.78 But, it appears at first blush that universal jurisdiction over the crime 
of genocide is only applied in limited cases.79 In accordance with Article 113-6 
every crime committed abroad by a French national is punishable in France.80 
Also, Article 113-7 permits the application of French law in cases where the 
victim is of French nationality at the time of the violation.81 In summary, “France 
has jurisdiction to prosecute acts of genocide committed abroad if the perpetrator 
or victim have French nationality.”82 However, “in such cases, criminal 
 
71. Status of Treaties, supra note 61; Canadian Heritage, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, http://www.pch. 
gc.ca/ddp-hrd/docs/treat-trait/un-eng.cfm#table1(last visited Feb. 2, 2014). 
72. Status of Treaties, supra note 61. 
73. Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act of 2000, SC 2000, c. 24 (Can), available at 
http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/C-45.9.pdf (last visited Feb. 2,  2014). 
74. Id. 
75. Status of Treaties, supra note 61. 
76. Id. 
77. Caroline Fournet, Reflection on the Separation of Powers: The Law of Genocide and the Symptomatic 
French Paradox, in THE CRIMINAL LAW OF GENOCIDE: INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE AND CONTEXTUAL 
ASPECTS 212 (Ralph Henham & Paul Behrens eds., 2007). 
78. Id. 
79. See Jan Wouters & Sten Verhoeven, The Prosecution of Genocide–in Search of A European 
Perspective, in THE CRIMINAL LAW OF GENOCIDE: INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE AND CONTEXTUAL 
ASPECTS 200 (Ralph Henham & Paul Behrens eds., 2007) [hereinafter The Prosecution of Genocide]. 
80. CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. 113-6 (Fr.). 
81. Id. at art. 113-8. 
82. The Prosecution of Genocide, supra note 79. 
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proceedings can only be initiated by the public prosecutor, following a complaint 
of the victim or his legal successor.”83 
Notwithstanding, Article 689 Code de Procédure Pénale allows for universal 
jurisdiction over offenses committed abroad if the perpetrator can be found on 
French territory, regardless of a link to France, providing that the international 
conventions, to which France is a party, allows extraterritorial jurisdiction.84 
Although genocide is not enumerated in the conventions that are subject to 
universal jurisdiction,85 under the framework of acts incorporating the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 827 and 955, creating the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and ICTR, respectively, 
France can exercise universal jurisdiction over genocide86 
D. The Netherlands 
On June 20, 1966, The Netherlands ratified the Genocide Convention.87 
Interestingly, the Netherlands registered objections to the United States 
reservations concerning Article IX (submission to the International Court of 
Justice).88 Thus, the Netherlands refused to recognize the United States as a party 
to the Genocide Convention. 
In terms of enacting legislation to implement the Genocide Convention, 
Article 3, of the Dutch Law on International Crimes (Wet Internationale 
Misdrijven) of June 19, 2003,89 closely aligns with the language of the Genocide 
Convention and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.90 Article 
2.a. permits the Dutch court to exercise universal jurisdiction over genocide 
“when the alleged perpetrator is present on Dutch territory.”91 
But, even under Dutch law, universal jurisdiction has its limitations.92 For 
instance, “Dutch courts will only prosecute if the alleged perpetrator cannot be 
extradited to another country on whose territory the acts are committed or whose 
national is the perpetrator or the victim of the crimes concerned or surrendered to 
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an international tribunal.”93Further, prosecution is under the sole discretion of the 
prosecutor.94 
To be sure, this is not an exhaustive list of State parties that have ratified and 
enacted legislation to implement the Genocide Convention.95But, what emerges 
from this brief comparative study is a consensus among State parties, at least 
judging from the language of domestic legislation, that the principle of universal 
jurisdiction should be applied to the crime of genocide.96 Thus, the central inquiry 
is whether the aforementioned State parties to the Genocide Convention enforce 
domestic legislation criminalizing genocide as a means to end impunity. In 
answer to this question, case studies of recent cases involving the Rwandan 
Genocide are presented below.97 
IV. CASE STUDIES: RWANDAN GENOCIDE CASES IN DOMESTIC COURTS 
Whatever one’s position is regarding whether or not the Genocide 
Convention codifies the principle of universal jurisdiction, States have 
increasingly responded in the affirmative when one considers the enactment of 
domestic legislation to implement the Genocide Convention.98 However, holding 
persons accused of genocide accountable, under domestic legislation 
criminalizing genocide, has yielded varying results. This section explores the 
various cases brought before domestic courts. 
A. The Netherlands: Universal Jurisdiction Not Retroactive? 
In 1998, Joseph Mpambara, a Rwandese, applied for asylum in the 
Netherlands.99 Mpambara was arrested on August 7, 2006, by Dutch authorities 
under the principle of universal jurisdiction.100 Mpambara was “accused of 
attacking a church, kidnapping, torture, and the murder of two mothers and their 
four children in Rwanda.” While Joseph Mpambara was sentenced to 20 years 
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imprisonment for torture on March 23, 2009, 101 the Dutch court held that it had 
no jurisdiction to try him for genocide.102 Similarly, the Dutch courts did not 
found jurisdictional ground to prosecute Michel Bagaragaza.103 In the 
Bagaragaza case, the ICTR charged Mihcel Bagaragaza, the head of the entity 
that controlled the Rwandan tea industry, with complicity in committing 
genocide.104 The ICTR prosecutor sought to transfer the case to Norway after 
Bagaragaza voluntarily surrender in 2005.105 But in the courts view original 
jurisdiction did not lie because Dutch law did not provide for universal 
jurisdiction over genocide at the time of the Rwandan genocide in 1994.106 
Finally, i+n the case of Yvonne Basebya, a Rwanda-born Dutch citizen, the 
Dutch court prosecuted her as a Dutch citizen.107 Basebya was accused of inciting 
“youngsters to commit murder against Tutsis during meetings, as evidenced by 
the song she sang, ‘Tuba Tsembe Tsembe’, which means let’s exterminate them 
all.”108 On March 1, 2013 the Dutch court convicted Basebya of inciting 
genocide.109 As a consequence, Basebya was sentenced to six years and eight 
months in jail.110 
B. France: A Slow Path to Prosecution 
“France has been accused of being slow to prosecute those allegedly linked 
to the genocide,” as evidenced in various cases.111 For instance, Laurent Serubuga 
was arrested in July 2013, under an international arrest warrant issued by 
Rwanda.112 The 77-year-old Hutu served as deputy army chief-of-staff during the 
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Rwandan Genocide.113 “Serubuga was part of a group of officers known as “The 
Juvenal Habyarimana comrades of July 5, 1973,” who had helped him overthrow 
former President Kayibanda.”114 As such, he was considered “one of the brains 
behind the killings.”115 However, the court in Douai, France, ordered the release 
of the suspect.116 The court’s rationale for its refusal to grant Rwanda’s 
extradition request was due to the fact that genocide did not exist as a crime 
under Rwandan criminal code at the time the atrocities occurred.117 Further, the 
court found that the statute of limitations expired since the arrest warrant was 
issued ten years after the alleged crimes.118 The judges did not indicate that the 
allegations were baseless, but rather that the suspect would not be granted a fair 
trial in Rwanda.119 Ironically, “France has repeatedly refused to extradite 
Genocide suspects to Rwanda, but has sent some to Tanzania to face trial at the 
ICTR. Yet, the ICTR has made transfers of genocide suspects to Rwanda.”120 
Prosecutors in the Serubuga case are seeking an appeal and express 
frustration with the French law.121 Alan Gautier, the head of Collective of Civil 
Parties for Rwanda, a French-based rights group, said it is the 15th or 16th time 
that France had turned down an extradition to Rwanda.122 For example, “[t]he 
Court of Appeal of Paris in 2011, rejected the extradition of Agathe 
Habyarimana, the widow of the former Rwandan president Habyarimana. In 
2010, it refused to extradite Eugene Rwamucyo, a Rwandan doctor.”123 
Notwithstanding, on November 13, 2013, a French Appeals Court finally 
approved the extradition of both Claude Muhayimana and Innocent 
Musabyimana for their suspected involvement in the 1994 Rwandan 
Genocide.124 And as the twentieth anniversary of the Rwandan Genocide 
approaches, France has begun its first trial. On February 4, 2014, Paul 
Simbikangwa was accused of financing the genocide and inciting genocide 
through radio and television broadcast.125 Soon thereafter, on March 14, 2014, 
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Simbikangwa was sentenced to 25 years in prison for his role in the 1994 
Rwandan genocide.126 
C. Canada: To Extradite or to Prosecute 
In its first Rwandan Genocide case, Canada chose to use immigration 
remedies rather than domestic legislation criminalizing genocide.127 Léon 
Mugesera fled to Canada after an arrest warrant was issued by Rwandan 
authorities for a speech that he gave in Kabaya before a 1,000 people, in his 
official capacity as Vice President of the National Republican Movement for 
Development and Democracy, “in which he threatened that Tutsis would be 
forcibly returned to Ethiopia.”128 On June 28, 2005, after several legal 
proceedings in the lower courts, the Supreme Court of Canada ultimately found 
that Mugesera was guilty of inciting genocide, and therefore, subject to 
deportation under immigration statutes.129 Yet, Mugesera was not deported to 
Rwanda until January 23, 2012, during which time authorities took to ascertain 
whether deportation posed a risk to his safety.130 Finally, Musegera was charged 
in Rwanda with genocide, incitement of genocide, and distribution of arms,131 and 
his trial began in substance on January 17, 2013.132 
However, Canada has convicted a perpetrator of genocide under the Crimes 
Against Humanity and War Crimes Act of 2000.133 Désiré Munyaneza was 
accused of “committing murder, psychological terror, physical attacks and sexual 
violence with intent to wiping out the Tutsi.”134 In 2009, “Munyaneza, a leader of 
a Rwandan militia . . . , was the first person to be convicted under the Act, and 
sentenced to life in prison for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes.”135 
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D. The United States: Immigration Fraud Cases 
Analogous to Canada, the United States has approached Rwandan genocide 
cases through immigration remedies. Thus, although the United States Congress 
passed the GAA in 2007 with broad bipartisan support, the GAA, like its 
predecessor the Proxmire Act, remains a sword in a sheath.136 The GAA attempts 
to go where the Proxmire Act did not dare to137 in that it expands the U.S. 
jurisdiction over genocidal actions committed by any perpetrator found in the 
U.S.138 However, the U.S. has been reluctant to exercise its expanded 
jurisdictional reach. 139Certainly, the opportunity to exercise jurisdiction 
presented itself in 2009 when Lazare Kobagaya, a Wichita, Kansas man, was 
accused of participating in acts of genocide in Rwanda.140 
Lazare Kobagaya was indicted in January 2009 for immigration fraud.141 
Although Kazare was accused of participation in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, 
he was indicted for lying on immigration forms.142 The charges alleged that 
Kobagaya fraudulently stated on his visa application that he was living in 
Rwanda until 1993, when the actual date he moved was in 1994.143 Kobagaya’s 
attorney, Kurt Kerns, insists that his client was associated with the genocide in 
Rwanda only after testifying on behalf of a former neighbor being tried for 
genocide in Finland (the Francois Bazaramba case).144 
However, the Prosecutors contended that they had witnesses that insist that 
Kobagaya worked in concert with Bazaramba in the planning and execution of 
the killings.145 Further, the United States authorities stated in a letter addressed to 
Finnish officials, requesting information on the Bazaramba case, that “witnesses 
alleged that Kobagaya incited others to commit arson, assault and murder by 
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directing people to commit those acts and threatening those who tried to decline 
to participate.”146 
Nonetheless, after two and a half years and over fifty witnesses brought from 
Africa to testify, the case was dismissed on August 25, 2011.147 The Department 
of Justice federal prosecutors filed a motion to dismiss the charges because they 
failed to disclose a witness which would have been favorable to the defense.148 
The missing witness was a woman who processed Kobagaya’s visa in September 
2008.149 The witness had informed the prosecutors’ investigators that discrepancy 
in the move date on the visa application would not have resulted in a denial of his 
visa application.150 
Recently, another case of immigration fraud involving the Rwandan 
Genocide arose in New Hampshire.151 Beatrice Munyenyezi was convicted in 
February 2013, “of entering the United States and securing citizenship by 
masking her role as a commander of one of the notorious roadblocks where 
Tutsis were singled out for slaughter.”152 The United States District Judge Steven 
McAuliffe found that the “defendant was actively involved, actively participated, 
in the mass killing of men, women and children simply because they were 
Tutsis.”153 This ruling was supported by evidence that the defendant “checked 
national identification cards at a roadblock in Butare, instructing Tutsis to sit and 
wait for Hutu militia armed with machetes and crude garden tools to hack and 
beat them to death.”154 Nevertheless, on July 15, 2013, the defendant was 
sentenced to ten years in prison for immigration fraud and not for her role in the 
Rwandan Genocide.155 Despite the prosecutors insistence on the maximum 
sentence because “she is as guilty as if she wielded the machete herself,”156 the 
GAA was never implicated in this case.157 So, although the Assistant United 
States Attorney Aloke Chakravarty proclaimed that “tolerating genocide was not 
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an option,”158 the question remains whether immigration fraud is sufficient to 
hold génocidaires accountable.159 
V. OBSTACLES TO DOMESTIC PROSECUTIONS OF GENOCIDE 
This case study reveals the different legal mechanisms that have been 
employed by some domestic courts in an attempt to hold génocidaires 
accountable.160 However, in order to recommend a clearer path towards ending 
impunity, it is important to understand the political considerations, legal 
interpretations of international instruments, and policies that may factor into 
State parties’ legal decisions to forego prosecution under domestic laws 
criminalizing genocide. The following section explores these issues more in-
depth. 
A. United States 
In the context of political considerations in the prevention and punishment of 
genocide, the thorny issue surrounding universal jurisdiction is the concept of 
State sovereignty.161 A look at the United States policies from ratification to the 
establishment of the ICC demonstrates the role politics have played in fashioning 
policies on domestic prosecutions for the crime of genocide. 
1. United States State Sovereignty Considerations in Ratification of the 
Genocide Convention 
The United States path towards ratification of the Genocide Convention was 
laden with political posturing. The reason the Proxmire Act failed to contemplate 
universal jurisdiction could best be explained by the lack of political will to 
include universal jurisdiction in the Proxmire Act because of the political capital 
gained from opposing the ratification of the Genocide Convention.162 In the mid-
1980’s, the terms in which the Genocide Convention were debated was largely 
framed by Conservative groups such as the Liberty Lobby.163 The pro-sovereignty 
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voices were concerned with the dilution of United States sovereignty abroad.164 
Namely, “the perception that the U.S. would be subordinate to the International 
Court of Justice or would be required to extradite accused American citizens for 
trial in foreign courts.”165 Thus, the ratification included the Lugar-Helms-Hatch 
Sovereignty Package.166 
Contrastingly, the Genocide Accountability Act of 2007 (GAA) passed with 
very little fanfare.167 The 2006 elections ushered in Democratic Congressional 
leadership, the status quo was challenged and the GAA was passed in 2007.168 
The GAA was introduced by Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL).169 The GAA garnered 
significant bipartisan support, and it appears the fears around universal 
jurisdiction did not rise to the forefront during the negotiations.170 This may be 
due in part to the 2006 elections that left Democrats in control of both 
chambers.171 Thus, legislative action on international human rights issues became 
a possibility.172 Further, a lobbyist such as the Liberty Lobby who opposed the 
ratification of the Genocide Convention no longer exists.173 Also, in the 1970’s 
the American Bar Association went from opposing universal jurisdiction to being 
a proponent.174 In addition, Senator Helms (R-NC), an arch-critic of the Genocide 
Convention, has since retired.175 
But, what is more notable is the Republican co-sponsors of the GAA: Senator 
Coburn (R-OK) and Senator Cornyn (R-TX).176 Their support may have been in 
part because the GAA was presented as a minor amendment to existing law.177 In 
addition, the support of the GAA may be due in part to tying the issue of Darfur 
to jurisdiction over genocide for which conservatives expressed considerable 
concern about the atrocities that were being committed in Darfur.178 Overall, the 
passage of the GAA was a reality because of a combination of political factors.179 
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In comparison, as previously indicated, Canada and France did not register 
reservations or objections to the Genocide Convention.180 While the Netherlands 
did register an objection, it was in opposition to the United States isolationist 
rhetoric as proposed in its reservations to Article IX of the Genocide 
Convention.181 Thus, as a matter of sovereignty considerations, the United States 
path towards ratification appears more politically calculated than the other State 
parties that are the subject of this article.182 
2. United States’ Political Consideration in the Ratification of the Rome 
Statute of the ICC 
In fact, the political consideration around state sovereignty is further 
reflected in the United States’ refusal to ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC.183 On 
December 31, 2000, President Bill Clinton signed the Rome Statute of the 
International Court on the last day it was open for signature.184 However, 
President Clinton “did not submit the treaty to the Senate for advice . . . . because 
he did not want U.S. citizens to be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court.”185 
Subsequently, President George Bush’s administration repudiated the signing of 
the treaty declaring that the United States has no legal obligation under the 
treaty.186 
While the United States has failed to sign or else re-sign the Rome Statute, 
President Barack Obama’s administration has taken a more positive approach 
towards the ICC.187 As a sign of diplomatic engagement, the United States has 
participated “as an Observer in the meetings of the ICC’s governing body, the 
Assembly of States Parties, since November 2009.”188 In addition, Ambassador 
Susan Rice has acknowledged that the ICC is set to be a viable instrument to hold 
senior leaders responsible for international crimes.189 
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3. The Consequences of Pursuing an Isolationist Sovereignty Policy 
The United States’ initial hostility towards the ICC and reservations in 
regards to applying universal jurisdiction has not subsided with the passage of the 
GAA. For while the passage of GAA purports to codify universal jurisdiction, the 
impetus for its enactment appears to be for a limited purpose: the situation in 
Darfur.190 As evidenced by the fact that the United States abstained from the vote 
to adopt United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593, referral of the Darfur 
situation to the ICC, instead of outright voting against the resolution because it 
“was confident that the . . . resolution protected US nationals and members of the 
armed services of other non-State Parties to the Rome Statute from the ICC’s 
jurisdiction.”191 
The United States’ continued reluctance to apply universal jurisdiction over 
the crime of genocide has left the federal judiciary bereft of a framework in 
which to try genocide cases under its current law (GAA).192 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court held in Medellin v. Texas193 and Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon194 that 
“[n]othing in the structure or purpose of the ICJ suggests that its interpretations 
were intended to be conclusive on our courts.” In addition, the international ad 
hoc tribunals provide little guidance in terms of universal jurisdiction over the 
crime of genocide.195 While it is true that the United States played a leading role 
in designing and establishing the Nuremberg Tribunal, the ICTY, and the ICTR, 
United States nationals and citizens of its allies were immune from prosecution.196 
Furthermore, ad hoc tribunals rely on cooperation from nation states to 
successfully prosecute génocidaires, not universal jurisdiction.197 
Arguably, the United States has a federal judiciary that is competent to try 
cases of first impression.198 Veritably, that is the position the United States 
District Court found itself in when it tried Chuckie Taylor Jr. under the Torture 
Victim Protection Act for the first time in 2009.199 The Torture Victim Protection 
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Act200 “criminalizes torture and provides U.S. courts jurisdiction to hear cases 
involving acts of torture committed outside the United States if the offender is a 
U.S. national or is present in the United States, regardless of nationality.”201 Thus, 
it appears that the United States is not reluctant to exercise universal 
jurisdiction.202 
But, to view Chuckie’s prosecution as a shift in the United States position on 
exercising universal jurisdiction over jus cogens crimes is to misread the political 
climate at the time of Chuckie’s conviction.203 The case involves a United States 
citizen who is the son of warlord Charles Taylor Sr.204 Chuckie was taken into US 
custody on March 30, 2006, a day after his father was surrendered for trial to the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, after attempting to enter the United States from 
Trinidad at Miami International Airport.205 Unfortunately, at the time of 
Chuckie’s arrest, Liberia did not have the judicial capacity to try serious crimes 
after fourteen years of civil war; nor was there an existing international tribunal 
mandated to prosecute past crimes.206 
As it were, the United States had a political interest in prosecuting Chuckie 
Taylor.207 After the United States failed attempt to lobby members of the Security 
Council to adopt a resolution to establish an ad hoc tribunal to address the 
situation in Darfur,208 this may have been an attempt to undercut the ICC’s 
legitimacy created by the precedent of referring the Darfur situation.209 At 
minimum, it was an opportunity to add substance to the United States’ insistence 
that it would hold its citizens accountable for violations of international law 
through domestic legislation when it obtained exemption from the ICC’s 
jurisdiction during the adoption of Resolution 1593.210Thus, foregoing the 
prosecution of Chuckie Taylor, a United States citizen, would have reinforced the 
growing sentiment among the international community that the United States is 
hypocritical in that it insists on shielding American citizens from being tried by 
the ICC while simultaneously allowing the ICC to try other non-State parties 
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such as in the case of Sudan.211 Hence, the Chuckie Taylor Jr. case appears to be 
an exception rather than an emerging trend. 
B. Canada, France, and the Netherlands 
In comparison, Canada, France, and the Netherlands have all ratified the 
Rome Statute.212 But, arguably, at first glance ratification of the Rome Statute, or 
the lack of reservations regarding sovereignty in the ratification of the Genocide 
Convention, has not necessarily hindered or advanced the domestic prosecutions 
for the crime of genocide.213 In fact, with the exception of the Netherlands, 
domestic prosecutions are relatively on par.214 However, a deeper look into the 
policy positions surrounding France’s misapprehension of universal jurisdiction 
as announced during the Nuremberg Trials,215 or Canada’s de facto grant of 
immunity to Nazi war criminals,216 illustrates the difficulty with which these State 
parties have encountered in conducting domestic prosecutions for genocide.217 
1. Canada 
History demonstrates that a failure to embrace universal jurisdiction, a norm 
in international law, results in an inability to effectively deal with jus cogens 
crime in general, and genocide specifically. The Finta case in Canada provides 
an illustration. After World War II, Canada permitted immigrants suspected of 
war crimes to take up residence and obtain citizenship.218 The Deschênes 
Commission was established to conduct an enquiry into the accusations and 
criticisms that Canada harbored Nazi War criminals.219 The report concluded that 
744 persons guilty of Nazi war crimes were living in Canada.220 Therefore, the 
Deschênes Commission recommended modifications to Canada’s criminal codes 
and immigration statutes, to permit prosecution and extradition.221 
As a result, on December 1, 1987, Imre Finta was the first to be tried under 
the new enacted legislation for war crimes.222 However, Finta was acquitted on all 
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eight counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The newly enacted 
legislation was a severe test for the judiciary, the trial judge guidelines for each 
accusation were difficult to follow.223 The last appeal in 1994 resulted in a final 
judgment and acquittal of Finta.224 The Finta trial left the Canadian government 
skittish.225 Therefore, it developed a policy to pursue perpetrators of international 
crimes through immigration remedies. It was only after the enactment of the 
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act of 2000 that the Canadian 
government resumed prosecution for international crimes.226 
2. France 
As a result of misinterpreting the concept of universal jurisdiction for the 
crime of genocide as presented in the Nuremberg trials,227 evidence demonstrates 
that the French Courts have also experienced considerable difficulty conducting 
domestic prosecutions for the crime of genocide.228 The Cour de Cassation’s 
decision on December 20, 1985, in the Barbie case, 229interpreted the Nuremberg 
definition Article 6(c), ‘within the jurisdiction of the tribunal,’ narrowly, in that it 
only applied to Nazism.230 As a consequence, “no other crime could be qualified 
as a crime against humanity, simply because it would necessarily be exterior, in 
time and circumstance, to the European Axis Powers.”231 It was only after the 
passage of the New Penal Code in 1994 that a crime could be classified as a 
crime against humanity.232 Even still, acts conducted between 1945 and 1994 
cannot be characterized as crimes against humanity.233 However, as stated 
previously, the procedural law adopting the French legislation to the Security 
Council Resolution 955 creating the ICTR provides the French courts with a 
means in which to exercise universal jurisdiction over international crimes.234 
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3. The Netherlands 
In contrast, the Netherlands who registered strong objections and essentially 
a rebuke to the United States, among other nation states, in regards to its 
reservations on Article IV of the Genocide Convention,235 has effectively 
conducted domestic prosecutions.236 This is not to suggest that the United States 
should ratify the Rome Statue, but rather to underscore the difficulty domestic 
courts have in prosecuting the crime of genocide when they equivocate on their 
legal obligation.237 For the “requirement of responsibility should clearly 
encompass [States parties to the Genocide Convention] acknowledgment of the 
crime of genocide, through its unequivocal prosecution and punishment.238 
VI. IMMIGRATION REMEDIES: A PRETEXT IN DOMESTIC PROSECUTIONS 
FOR GENOCIDE 
Equivocation on the legal obligation to prosecute the crime of genocide 
results in fashioning policies that prefer pursuing immigration remedies as a 
pretext in regards to the crime of genocide.239 On the one hand, pursuing 
immigration remedies that results in extradition would meet the legal obligation 
under the Genocide Convention. As a matter of fact, Article VII of the Genocide 
Convention requires “Contracting Parties [to] pledge to . . . grant extradition in 
accordance with their laws and treaties in force.”240 On the other hand, the 
problem with charging persons accused of genocide with immigration fraud, as 
opposed to the specific crime of genocide under domestic legislation, is that it 
does not always result in extradition. 
The Kobagaya case illustrates this point.241 The prosecutors aimed to 
establish Kobagaya’s participation in the Rwandan Genocide through 
immigration fraud by proving that Kobagaya lied on his visa application which 
indicated that he lived in Rwanda until 1993 when he actually moved in 1994.242 
Thus, although the United States prosecution planned to use evidence and 
witnesses to establish that Kobagaya participated in the Rwandan genocide, 
Kobagaya was charged with lying to immigration officials not genocide.243 
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Consequently, the charges were dismissed when the prosecutors failed to disclose 
a witness favorable to the defendant that would have testified that a change in 
date would not have influenced the decision to approve the visa application. 
Hence, the strategy of pursuing suspected génocidaires through immigration 
remedies does not always result in prosecution or extradition.244 
Rwanda’s government drew a similar conclusion in regards to the 
Munyenyezi case.245 When the New Hampshire judge declared a mistrial on 
March 15, 2012 because the jury was deadlocked,246 Rwanda’s prosecutor 
general, Martin Ngoga, stated that “Western jurisdictions [do not] understand the 
gravity of the case before them.”247 He went on to say, “The cases are handled in 
a very simplistic way.”248 According to Ngoga, “in the past [Rwanda] applauded 
trials abroad because [it was believed] that they would substitute extradition,” but 
that has not been the case.249 Thus, ultimately, immigration remedies, as a pretext 
for prosecution of genocide appears to minimize the gravity of the crime.250 
VII. DOMESTIC PROSECUTION: COST ANALYSIS 
While developing the framework to try genocide cases in domestic courts is a 
necessary component towards ending impunity for the crime of genocide, there 
are significant challenges in prosecuting human rights abuses committed 
abroad.251 Conservation of legal resources is a serious consideration for national 
judicial systems that cannot be easily dismissed.252 However, the economic costs 
must be weighed against the societal costs of impunity. The following section 
provides a cost analysis. 
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A. Judicial Economy: The Price of Ending Impunity 
Setting aside political considerations, legal misinterpretations, and policy 
determinations that may present obstacles to domestic prosecutions, conservation 
of limited resources of national legal systems may explain the apprehension to 
prosecute suspected génocidaires under domestic laws criminalizing genocide.253 
Certainly, addressing issues such as “language barriers, the need to evaluate 
complex and unfamiliar political and historical contexts, the difficulty of gaining 
access to the necessary evidence, and risks to potential witnesses” come at an 
economic cost.254 
This cost is reflected in the recent cases tried before domestic courts.255 The 
Kobagaya case is a prime example.256 The cost of the trial was over $1 million 
dollars.257 There is reason to believe the Munyenyezi case, which initially resulted 
in a mistrial and then a subsequent conviction, was significantly higher in costs.258 
Conceivably, the fifteen-year fight to deport Léon Mugesera was a costly 
endeavor.259 
But, there is nothing, by way of the facts, to suggest that the cost of litigation 
would dramatically increase for prosecutions brought under domestic laws 
criminalizing genocide. Indeed, since immigration fraud cases are a mere pretext 
to prosecutions for the crime of genocide, the same evidence to prove genocide is 
proffered. “In the Kobagaya case, American prosecutors [used] witness 
statements and evidence collected by the Finnish government against Francois 
Bazaramba.”260 The witnesses in the Munyenyezi case consisted of “experts on the 
genocide, who gave details of the violence, and residents of Butare.261 Finally, in 
the Mugesera case, Canadian prosecutors lined up twenty-eight witnesses to 
testify regarding Mugesera’s involvement in the Rwandan Genocide.262 Hence, 
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there are no economic savings to be garnered in pursuing immigration remedies 
as opposed to prosecutions under domestic criminal statutes.263 
B. Societal Costs: Impunity for the Crime of Genocide 
A candle was lit at the genocide memorial in Kigali on January7, 2014, 
during commemorations marking the 20th Anniversary of the Rwandan 
Genocide.264 The flame will be carried by young people. Young people who 
became heads of households265 when their parents were massacred during the 90 
days of genocidal hell. 
Since the 1994 Genocide, a new word has appeared in the Rwandan 
vocabulary to describe the psychological manifestations of the children who are 
victims of the genocide: Ihahamuka.266 The term Ihahamuka joins two words: 
haha, which means lungs or respiration, and Muka, which means without.267 In 
fact, “genocide is one of the most pressing threats to the health of populations in 
the twenty-first century.”268Genocidal violence produces mortality rates that far 
exceed “other public health emergencies including malaria and HIV/AIDS.” 
Unsurprisingly, “the impact of genocide on local health economies is 
catastrophic, and the opportunity costs of diverting scarce global health dollars 
toward ameliorating genocide related outcomes are substantial.”269 Thus, the 
societal costs of impunity, which includes economic costs, surpasses the 
economic costs of prosecution.270 
Despite the international community’s affirmation in 1948 that “genocide is a 
crime under international law . . . .and condemned by the civilized world,” 
mankind has yet to be liberated from its odious scourge. There are significant 
societal costs to bear when State parties to the Genocide Convention fail to live 
up to their legal obligation to prevent and punish the crime of genocide.271 As 
such, State parties should adhere to one of the foremost basic principles of 
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criminal law: punishment as means of deterrence.272 Thus, the punishment of the 
crime must meet the gravity of the offense in order to deter would be 
génocidaires.273 As it stands, immigration fraud, while morally questionable, is an 
insufficient tool in the fight against impunity for genocide.274 The crime among 
all crimes necessitates a punishment that carries a stigma.275 Therefore, State 
parties should prosecute genocide suspects under their existing domestic laws 
criminalizing genocide. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Finally, the adoption of the Genocide Convention was the first and necessary 
step in denouncing the crime of genocide.276 However, post-Nuremberg, State 
parties have equivocated on the application of universal jurisdiction for the crime 
of genocide.277This equivocation has led to pursing policies that undermine the 
fight against impunity in two central ways.278 First, State parties have struggled 
with developing a framework in which to effectively prosecute perpetrators of 
genocide in domestic courts.279 Second, equivocation on the principle of universal 
jurisdiction has caused State parties to fashion immigration remedies that are 
inadequate to address the crime of genocide.280 In the final cost analysis, the 
societal cost in allowing impunity for genocide far out-weighs the financial cost 
of prosecuting génocidaires in domestic courts.281 Thus, State parties must adhere 
to the basic principles of criminal law, deterrence, and prosecute génocidaires, 
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